USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANSFORMING MILITARY LEADERS

by

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A phrase that captures the challenges associated with the Global War on Terrorism is: "Dirty funds from Grand Caymans to dirty bombs in Grand Central." It identifies America's security challenge within an interconnected global environment as money from ill gotten means in one part of the world can eventually and somewhat unknowingly support a catastrophic event in another part. Consequentially, we must transform our military instrument of power to defeat enemies and show alliance with friends to defeat this adverse aspect of globalization; however, this requires a transformation of military power and a renewed emphasis on developing new strategic leadership competencies to fully execute our National Security Strategy across the parochial elements of diplomatic, information, military and economic power. This paper examines globalization and the transformed thinking needed by today's military leaders; furthermore, it advocates that leaders must focus on developing four main strategic leadership competencies which are broadly identified as communicating, empowering, innovating and educating. In sum, the United States Military must transform its military thinking and use of power to combat a world order dominated by asymmetrical threats and failed nation-states with a creed of "leadership beyond authority" as its cornerstone that is supported by these four competencies.

TRANSFORMING MILITARY LEADERS

"Dirty funds from Grand Caymans, to dirty bombs in Grand Central" cleverly captures the essence of globalization and the national security concerns Americans face.\(^1\) This sweeping phrase epitomizes "cradle to cradle" terrorism; however, our security depends upon a translucent lens to view it. Obviating the lens from our enemies and sharing its transparency with allies challenges military leadership throughout globalization. The importance of globalization and its cascading effect on transforming military leaders clearly mandates a "continental-divide" shift in our military power; consequentially, a military power with a momentous strategic leadership role that champions the parochial elements of diplomatic, information, military and economic power to outwardly enforce our nation's security strategy, and internally collaborate and lead across all levels of governing authority.

While there are many elements of power, Patrick N. Kelleher tells us that "The primary instrument of national power responsible for implementing foreign policy is arguably the Department of Defense." Yet, in an era of globalization, our determined use of military power has proven ineffective more times than not. To explore this nexus between military power and globalization, this paper will first broadly discuss the conceptual influences that the little understood concept of globalization and its effects have on the way the United States envisions and uses military power. This discussion then lays the foundation to identify four fundamental leadership competencies strategic leaders need to create a type of "continental-divide" transformation of our military power to ensure success in the 21 st Century. These leadership competencies are titled communicating, empowering, innovating and educating; but, their understanding and application are more complicated by this networked global environment. This paper will show that when applied properly, these competencies will create strategic leaders whom outwardly champion parochial elements of power to enforce our national security and inwardly lead across all levels of governing authority.

Globalization

The nature of globalization and its effect on military power are best captured by Williamson Murray and Maggregor Knox, authors of *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*, when they stated: "The great military revolutions of the past have suggested, changes in society and politics—not in technology alone—are the most revolutionary forces of all." It is precisely the transformational and interweaving networks of globalization that transcends the diplomatic, information, military and economic elements of power.

Thomas Barnett, author of *The Pentagon's New Map*, tells us that:

America has served quite ably as globalization's ideological wellspring: each and every day we put on display—for all to see—the almost unlimited utility of broadband economic connectivity, freedom of action within minimal rule sets, and the unbridled ambition afforded by the apparent certainty of long-term peace.⁴

More aptly, our government's national security is nested in globalization as the current National Security Strategy (NSS) states: "The United States possesses unprecedented and unequaled—strength and influence in the world." In fact, our nation's defense roadmap directs that today's war against terrorism is one of global reach, within a global enterprise, and with an uncertain duration. Yet, a characterization of globalization that remains robust and relevant comes from authors David Held and Anthony McGrew. They best illustrate it as "a set of processes that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power."

It is true that we live in an age of increasing globalization fraught with inimitable turmoil, trade injustices, economic interdependence and international media dominance; yet, national security remedies must mature to accommodate those global characteristics. Accordingly, author Jerry Harris cites, "The globalists support a multinational approach to security, civic engagements for nation building and cross-border integration of production." Conversely, Barnett indicates that "Globalization seemed to be remaking the world, but meanwhile the U. S. military seemed to be doing nothing more than babysitting chronic security situations on the margin. However, not unlike Carl Von Clausewitz's balanced "trinity of war" theory, the elements of power have matured from parochial options of mutual exclusiveness to those that require mutual inclusiveness are not necessarily balanced in execution.

Clearly, by our over emphasis and lack of success, we need a "continental-divide shift" in how we influence international governance through the instrument of military power. The key issue is whether military power has preeminence in this dynamic era of globalization or should there be a more balanced approach. It seems clear that the American public desires a more balanced approach with respect to the far-reaching effect of our nation's use of military power. For example, in a more simple time, a citizen of ancient Rome could walk from one end of the Empire to the other without fear of attack. That was possible because Rome's military might was truly omnipotent and provided an unconquerable blanket of security. Can the same be said of the results of a conceptually and equally dominant American military power? No, globalization makes that task extremely difficult. In fact, one of the differences today is that the American people expect the kind of Roman, military domination to "win the war and peace" with

equal impunity. Providing a security blanket that proactively protects Americans in an era of globalization is, indeed, a sizeable order and perhaps at an impasse with today's leadership focus.

Centuries ago, one of the best military theorists (Sun Tzu) argued for, what would in today's vocabulary be considered, a balanced inter-agency approach. He said that "the moral strength and intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if these were properly applied war could be waged with certain success." More importantly, he stated:

Only when the enemy could not be overcome by these means was there recourse to armed force, which was to be applied so that victory was gained: (a) in the shortest possible time; (b) at the least possible cost in lives and effort; (c) with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties.¹²

Yet, today's networked and in some cases non-state enemy doesn't respond well to strategies that are based on modeling, reasoning, rules or even international pressure. Modern theorist Colin S. Gray, author of *Modern Strategy*, asserts "strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose."13 Bundling the elements of power to compel political purpose with a balanced, yet transformational approach is best articulated by the following statement: *If post conflict is a continuation of military power, then military power must be a tapestry of economic, political, and military threads; each intertwined with one another, yet none stronger than the other.*¹⁴ Nevertheless, today's complex security environment expects synergy across the elements of power. Although these elements may seem strangely straight forward and commonsensical, the fog and friction during execution make them difficult to integrate.

Walter J. Boyne, author of *Beyond the Wild Blue*, decrees, "Political and military philosophers from Sun Tzu to Winston Churchill to Colin Powell have always agreed that political policies, without military strength are hollow reeds doomed to failure." In this era of globalization, military power is often the first choice for conflict resolution; yet, the last paragraph of the preamble to our NSS stresses the importance of collaborative efforts across the elements of power. Furthermore, this security strategy requires the "use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing" in defending our nation's freedom. If globalization is the medium in which our national security must survive in, then the concept that military power, and how leaders apply it, are inherently intertwined with economic growth and political activity.

It is undeniable that we live in a world dominated by asymmetrical threats, failed nationstates and emergent and venerable economic nations. Albeit, the first page of our NSS tells us that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones." Yet, very few Americans understand the influential consequences of globalization; even more alarming, comprehend how it infiltrates our economy, culture, government and national security. Admittedly, there is much debate about globalization and its effect. Positive or negative, the fact remains globalization is a force our leaders must constantly be aware of as they grow and shape a security environment fraught with asymmetric threats in the 21 st Century. In essence, they need a transformational mind set change when developing or using military power.

Transformations Needed Focus

New challenges within the framework of globalization demand leverage; however, leveraging traditional military power can be neither prudent nor dominant. It is vital that our leaders understand and fully exploit a transformed military power immersed in globalization and comprehend how it impacts our national security while combating asymmetric threats in the 21 st Century. Additionally, it is fundamental that they understand military transformation is deeper than faster, smaller, cheaper weapons of lethality; even more dynamic than morphing operational forces and re-engineering defense practices, policies or fiscal programming.¹⁹ The interconnected concepts of transformation and globalization are deeply encrypted within our National Defense Strategy (NDS), directly derived from the Secretary of Defense (Donald H. Rumsfeld), vetted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and originated in the NSS.

Both past and current CJCSs, Generals Richard B. Myers and Peter Pace, define transformation as:

a combination of technology, intellect and cultural adjustments—adjustments that reward innovation and creativity" and "concepts and practices, technologies and capabilities, roles and missions, organizational structures, internal processes, doctrine and education, personnel policies, and much more.²⁰

In the same vein, the NDS requires a transformation that is continuous and more than technological solutions. Moreover, transformation changes the way we think about challenges and opportunities, the way the defense establishment adapts to new perspectives and the way it refocuses capabilities to meet future challenges rather than those we are already prepared to meet.²¹ As expected, the NDS seeks to build from our strength and influence by "creating conditions conducive to a secure international order favorable to freedom, democracy, and economic opportunity."²²

It is true that our military power delivered decisive blows in World War I and II, and served well in the Korean conflict. Yet, the conflict resolutions dominated by military power from Vietnam through Bosnia and Somalia were not so conclusive, which in part were influenced by the globalization characteristics discussed earlier. In fact, Jeffrey Record reminds us that "What

is not in dispute is that all major failed US uses of force since 1945—in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia—have been against materially weaker enemies." ²³ The core military goal for the current conflict in Iraq is best stated by Michael E. O'Hanlon: "The U.S. armed forces simply were not prepared for the core task that the United States needed to perform when it destroyed Iraq's existing government—to provide security, always the first responsibility of any sovereign government or occupier."²⁴

So how can America win the war and peace with equal impunity? Although, Mao Tsetung said, "Power grows out of the barrel of the gun," to win the war and peace, the military must urgently transform intellectually as much as it does technologically. However, this endeavor requires more than altering organizations and weapon systems in order to meet the challenges of the 21 st century. In addition, General Douglas MacArthur once wrote, "Power is one thing. The problem of how to administer it is another. Convincingly, it seems that strong strategic leadership and civilian trust in military officers' views are the most appropriate mechanisms to answer the "winning the war and peace" question. Nonetheless, transformation, in an era of globalization, requires strong strategic leadership and new ways of implementing an already frayed military element of national power.

Our NSS is careful to point out that the "United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence."²⁷ But, what is not so clear is the dangerous divide that occurs when military dominance is likened to instruments of first resort in remedies of national security. R. D. Hooker, Jr. warns "powerful states, whose military dominance suggests 'easy' solutions for intractable problems, war cuts through the tortured legalisms of international institutions, shortcuts leaky economic embargoes, and truncates difficult and frustrating diplomacy."²⁸ This paper submits that Hooker, and advocates of a transformed military power concept, agrees with the following: "Military force is a blunt instrument of policy; the hope that it can be surgically precise is usually wrong and always dangerous."²⁹ The coordinated application of military power in support of national security becomes extremely important in a complex world subjected to the influences of globalization. Hence, a type of transformational thinking that needs to be incorporated by today's senior leaders is exactly when and to what extent military force should be used.

Unquestionably, today's strategic leaders have recognized the asymmetric challenges of the 21st Century. However, our nation's leadership faces a whole new set of circumstances immersed in globalization. Faced with a conceptually similar set of circumstances, where the future was radically different than the past, President Lincoln in his annual message to Congress in December of 1862 declared: "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the

stormy present....As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew."³⁰ The fact that we now face inter-related webs of networked states and non-states, vice the classical Cold-war scenario of nation-state influencing neighboring nation-states, is a poignant illustration that we must collaborate across all levels of governing authority with respect to the challenges that surround the element of military power in national security.

Two findings that reinforce a recommendation for a transformed element of military power and leadership thinking, clearly able to collaborate across the other elements of power, come from author Don M. Snider. His monograph on the 1987 and 1988 NSS confirmed the need to transform our element of military by the following statement: "Strong emphasis on military instruments of power, almost to the exclusion of the others." Additional research, from President Clinton's 1994 NSS, validated strong leadership by stating: "Never has American leadership been more essential." Both findings strenuously support strong leadership and collaborative integration among all agencies within our arsenal of national power in ensuring our security aims worldwide.

Momentous strategic leadership in our senior leaders enables collaborative integration across the other elements of power. This concept has roots in US history, as evidenced by then Secretary of War (William Marcy), when he cautioned the commanding generals in the Mexican War stating: "tasks related to civil administration would be the 'least pleasant' part of their duties." However, Ulysses S. Grant, commanding General of the Union Army during the Civil War, articulated the non-globalization world and buttressed the perceived new challenge in today's complex globalization when he surmised, "Fighting generals believed that military objectives should come first: win the war and then worry about the political ramifications later." We can learn from examining the ideas of these two leaders to ask the right questions; but, the age of throwing caution to the wind and advising our military leaders to not worry about political fall-out have all but disappeared.

Why is all of this self reflection necessary or important? If it was patriotic for 55 delegates from all walks of life in Colonial America, to include military service, to offer their notional recommendations to form a "more perfect union," then we should welcome transformed military power solutions from our senior military strategic leaders that intertwine economic, diplomatic and informational power elements. In a democratic society, with a proven record of historical compromise successes, authority and freedom of compromise must be given to those charged with leading intellectual capacities across the elements of power. Perhaps strong leadership can employ transformed military power to transcend globalization and ensure our security. A holistic and implied transformed military power depends on economic growth and political

institutions. Furthermore, this approach is well suited to America and their allies, yet disruptive to their enemies.

The age of rapid change in today's global environment is both a technological and organizational challenge; therefore, developing strategic leaders' intellect is essential for survival. Adapting to that environment challenges our intellect, motivation and our professional military culture. In fact, General Peter Pace, 16th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, characterized our roles as future strategic military leaders when he said, "Our challenge is to apply our experience and expertise in an adaptive and creative manner, encouraging initiative, innovation, and efficiency in the execution of our responsibilities."35 Additionally, he points out that, "Transformation is a continual process, not an end state. We must transform if we are to meet future challenges."³⁶ At the end of the day, transformation must start from the top down; better yet, identifying leadership competencies that seam the gaps of cultural diversity and ease the burden of future military leaders to—lead beyond authority. The four leadership competencies, this research discovered that best meet (and exceed) that challenge and define transformed strategic leadership thinking, are characterized as communicating, empowering, innovating and educating. This paper prescribes needed military changes to encourage their growth, while it defends and examines their relevancy. The maturation of these strongly linked competencies will seam the gaps of cultural diversity and ease the intellectual burden of future military leaders, thusly enabling them to lead beyond authority during an uncertain and volatile period of globalization.

Leadership Competencies

Superior strategic leadership is paramount when it comes to fighting and winning our nations wars. Thusly, we must pursue a strategy of intellectual transformation which develops strategic leaders able to lead across parochial elements of national power. However, it is important to clarify that each competency interrelates with one another in developing effective strategic leadership. For example, mastering the art of communication is challenged without a charismatic leader willing to empower the organization at all levels. Accordingly, Michael J. Marquardt, author of *Building the Learning Organization*, had this to say about the effectiveness of mastering one competency without the other: "If groups are empowered but not enabled, they are very dangerous 'mad pilots,' with lots of power but no direction. If they are enabled but not empowered, they are like 'caged eagles,' with lots of ability that they are not allowed to use." Therefore, we must understand that nurturing these competencies to maturation require our best people and their best efforts.

We can no longer afford to wait for great leaders who somehow persuade, cajole, or simply use their charisma in herding the United States military to transformation nirvana. In fact, the reverse is unequivocally the solution. As this paper explores each competency, you (the reader and future military leader) should view each competency with a measured sense of urgency and critical eye; moreover, be cognizant of the fundamental premise: Strong leadership is essential as we transform our military. As you consider the arguments presented for these four thinking competencies, you should reflect on Daryl R. Conner's, author of *Leading at the Edge of Chaos*, enduring statement about leaders as follows:

Leaders in this new era of *perpetual unrest* (unending, fundamental changes punctuated by higher or lower levels of urgency) must be of a certain mind-set to successfully oversee their organizations as they confront an interminable torrent of slight adjustments, significant modifications, and dramatic revolutions.³⁸

Communicating

One of four required leadership competencies military leaders need in the 21 st century is communicative skills that create networks of partnerships throughout the organization. Simply acknowledging that organizations need to change and adapt in order to survive is not sufficient. Buying into the concept of leading beyond authority, and clearly expressing that concept vertically and horizontally is more the order of the day. Conclusively, one must profoundly assume communication not only exists, but it exists on many levels and seamlessly throughout the entire organization.

Although this may seem obvious and simple, Clausewitz reminds us that "Everything in War is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." Additionally, he shares an important and universal constant that military genius plays an essential part in making the difficult simple. Admittedly, academic liberty may have been taken in equating military genius to strategic leader; however, breeding strategic leaders amidst globalization requires "real genius," or visionary leadership able to simplify the complex and communicate that simplicity. Hence, the reason for developing communicative skills that create networks of partnerships throughout an organization emerged as the first competency that today's military leader needs to possess.

To defend this competency, this paper offers the need for pathfinding, the first of three basic functions that Stephen Covey addresses in his book, *Three Roles of the Leader in the New Paradigm*. Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider paraphrase *pathfinding* as the leader's ability to "deal with tying the organization's value system and vision to the mission and environment through a strategic plan." How many times have you heard the questions: What is the commander's intent? or What is the exit strategy? Both are easily answered if the

strategic leader has mastered the art of communicating. Furthermore, communicating the values, mission and vision throughout the organization carries additional motivation if done top down and horizontally. In fact, followers of the leader-member exchange (LMX) theory contend that "organizations stand to gain much from having leaders who can create good working relationships;" and those relationships start with communicating.⁴¹

Revisions to that 28-year old LMX theory found a high degree of correlation between superb communicating leaders and superior performing organizations. The LMX theory discovered the following results: more positive performance evaluations, promotion rate increases, greater organizational commitment and an overall superior sense of organizational accomplishment and prosperity. ⁴² It is worth noting that the research primarily focused on direct leader-to-subordinate interaction; but supplemental analysis of leader-driven communication, down and across the organization, remains just as supportive. As noted, interaction between leader and organization, across all levels, produces a positive effect; but, how a leader affects this process is key in developing his or her communicative skill.

We are all familiar with web sites or bulletin boards plastered with organizational values, missions and visions; yet, the realist in all of us understands the implementation of those espoused statements requires more than visual acuity to succeed. Francis J. Gouillart and James N. Kelly, authors of *Transforming The Organization*, list four primary tasks needed for success in this endeavor; however, two key tasks pertain to this needed communicative skill competency. The two tasks that best illustrate the communicative competency are: 1) Creating wide-band, interactive communication; and 2) Encouraging the formation of "natural work teams."

The authors cite the example of a town meeting as the vehicle used by the leader in support of the former task. The example amplifies the leader's ability to create networks throughout the organization, focusing on the horizontal means of communicating as opposed to the vertical. Another example, closer to home, was the ability of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to discuss Army transformation at the Army War College in September of 2005. It was this author's clear sensing that it was not so much the information passed, but the interactive method of delivery which facilitated the information flow horizontally. Consequently, most members of the audience now carry the transformation message forward, well informed.

The latter task to illustrate the communicative competency is the most compelling. A profound and lasting dynamic forms when leaders encourage natural teams. In short, diverse disciplines lashed together to form a blended unit fosters innovation and ultimately permeates

the organization. Accordingly, Gouillart and Kelly cite leadership as the key inception point for the creation of such teams.⁴⁶ The freshest example, viewed through the lens of the War on Terrorism, is the following statement by our current Chairman, General Peter Pace: "It is our collaborative efforts with our OSD counterparts, the interagency, and our Coalition partners that will ultimately determine our success in this war." In this case, the most senior military leader reaffirms the critical need to lead across political and military boundaries by encouraging a natural team to collectively engage an overarching mission to fight terrorism. This synergistically combines with horizontal communication to create those wide band networks.

Empowering

Adopting a charismatic leadership style that empowers the organization at all levels is what Covey labels *empowering*. Clearly, it is the easiest of the four key competencies to characterize, but perhaps the most difficult to acquire. Wong and Snider paraphrase empowering as "igniting the latent talent, ingenuity, and creativity in the people to accomplish the mission." It is true that many bosses use a variety of methods in "igniting" their subordinates, but adopting a charismatic style may be the most effective, positive, and encompassing trait that a military leader can possess.

Moreover, Edgar H. Schein, author of *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, expands the leverage of charisma by stating: "The simplest explanation of how leaders get their message across is through charisma in that one of the main elements of that mysterious quality undoubtedly is a leader's ability to communicate major assumptions and value in a vivid and clear manner." It is widely accepted that many military leaders in World War II (Marshall, Eisenhower or MacArthur) had charisma; but how did they leverage that charisma? Lieutenant General Stephen J. Chamberlin, MacArthur's chief of staff, stated: "MacArthur was a great leader because he could place responsibility in subordinates and let them go." Indeed, more examples throughout the war, and after, assure the reader of the powerful agent of empowering subordinates with a charismatic leadership style. But all point to the same conclusion, future military leaders clearly need to lead beyond authority.

Developing charisma in our future military leaders is worth examining; moreover, this paper asserts that charisma is either innately or astutely acquired. Convinced a balance approach is needed, potential military leaders can abet their development by immersing themselves in an environment which endures challenges each day; additional self improvement efforts include advance education, improved communication learning and expanding interpersonal skills. Most assuredly, developing charisma is neither a spectator sport nor an

activity to be championed indifferently. *The Fifth Discipline* author, Peter M. Senge, defends the development of natural leaders as "the by-product of a lifetime of effort—effort to develop conceptual and communication skills, to reflect on personal values and to align personal behavior with values, to learn how to listen and to appreciate others and others' ideas." Therefore, this supports a charismatic leadership style that empowers the organization at all levels is mandatory to direct the military transformation effort, and this leadership needs to leverage the third competency of innovating.

Innovating With Integrity

The third leadership competency, called innovating with integrity, is clearly embedded in Senge's above quote. This competency is supremely supported by the United States Air Force's stated core values and the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS). In fact, the Air Force's three core values (Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do) strike at the heart of developing an integrity-based work ethic that outlaws careerism and rewards innovation. Additionally, the NMS espouses, "to succeed, the Armed Forces must integrate Service capabilities in new and innovative, reduce seams between combatant commands and develop more collaborative relationships with partners at home and abroad." The contention is that the third leadership competency enables future military leaders to "walk the walk and talk the talk" through the medium of high moral character and creating a positive environment of innovation, as opposed to the personal performance-based reward system our military has corrupted over time.

There are many examples of integrity-rich leaders of the past, and how their moral character led to great successes on and off the battlefield. Bruce Catton, author of *The Army of the Potomac,* best captured the detrimental impact of a leader devoid of integrity when he said: "The problems among the Union generals clearly reflected deficiencies in their character that reduced their effectiveness." The same can be said about an organization's lack of innovation, or the counter-productiveness that careerism injects as organizations struggle to achieve their missions. In terms of the real impact of not creating that innovative environment, former Chief of Staff of the Army (General Eric Shinseki) had this to offer: "The development of bold, innovative leaders of character and competence is fundamental to long-term health of the Army organization." Moreover, if the agreed position that change, more aptly defined as transformation, is the vision for tomorrow's military; then developing a culture of innovation with the integrity to take appropriate risks are paramount. However, the continued growth of that

embolden culture is directly contiguous to our ability to breed cross-cultured leaders with abilities to lead beyond authority.

Educating

That brings us to the final leadership competency of educating, which is certainly more critical in today's globalized and ever-changing environment and essential for tomorrow's military leaders. The notion of breeding cross-service cultured officers through continued professional military education, while promoting joint synergy in training and operations, must become endemic if our military is to succeed in Conner's environment of *perpetual unrest*. So much so that General Pace identified strengthening our "joint war-fighting" as a major task in his latest message about "Shaping the Future." In this message he mortgages the future of our military on the legacy of joint synergy and the furthering of professional education.⁵⁵

In line with his strong desires for developing this legacy, the authors of *Leadership Development: Beyond Traits and Competencies* contend, "joint war-fighting leadership assessments would provide a substantive basis for continual reframing of professional military education." Additionally, they champion a "networked approach to joint leadership" by citing that multiple leadership perspectives correlate to an officer corps more adept in handling an environment that constantly changes. They summarize the importance of joint leadership development as "more beneficial to military professions," and "critical for progress in service to America's security." ⁵⁷

The leadership competency of educating is a foundation that enables the other three competencies to keep pace with today's globalized world. Building upon the foundation that our nation's security depends on the education of its military leaders, the need to cultivate and breed cross-cultural leaders becomes a direct function of joint education. Furthermore, General Pace deduces that "the best investment we can make is in our professional development." So Moreover, he cites "Upward leadership and individual empowerment are force multipliers," as the key transition from a Service-centric culture to one that produces "joint competence." Our only recourse is a remedy of joint-cultural education that invites rapid growth in junior officers.

The idea of leading beyond authority discussed in the empowering section has education at its soul. The story of a self-educated, country boy from Illinois that taught himself to be a lawyer and ended up as the leader responsible for bringing our country from a divisive and wartorn nation in 1860 to a peace-loving and galvanized democracy by 1865 is a prime example of leading beyond authority through education. While it is this paper's intent not to examine the great leadership traits or characteristics of President Abraham Lincoln, but to pose this question:

Do true leaders innately acquire these competencies or astutely learn them through experience and expertise across a broad spectrum of intense leadership activity? A little of both are necessary in our military leaders especially in a transformational era. In a personal interview with Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1963, Edgar Puryear asked, "How does one develop as a decision maker? Is it a God-given talent, or can it be developed, and if so, how does one grow and improve?" His answer was twofold; first, the importance of being around people that make decisions and secondly, the importance of education to include reading history. It is amazing that Eisenhower was able to distill a simple answer from a complex question that at its basis supports the foundation of life-long education. Will future military leaders be able to do the same in this fast paced globalization? If you believe, as Eisenhower did, that the art of decision-making in leadership is developed by immersion and education; then surrounding yourself with those that develop and perform the interlinked four key competencies of communicating, empowering, innovating and educating is essential for our future leaders.

Conclusion

In hopes of assuaging global concerns about our nation's security dilemmas this paper highlighted the importance of globalization and its cascading effect on transformed military power. It clearly delineated a shift in our military power. More importantly, a military power backed by a momentous strategic leadership role that champions the parochial elements of power to outwardly enforce our nation's security strategy, and internally collaborate and lead across all levels of governing authority. Nonetheless, it is the element of Military power that draws so much attention, and contention, from our enemies, allies and the public we serve. Hence we need to ensure our strategic leaders better develop the competencies of communicating, empowering, innovating and educating to effectively lead in today's everchanging globally interconnected environment.

We continue to struggle with rehabilitative efforts on challenging strategic transformation of military power in an inherently, violent and unstable era. Historians argue that the days, months, even years prior to World War I & II portrayed such a climate of volatility. Others offer the US Civil War and early Revolutionary War years as preeminent proof of eras seething with instability. Whichever school of thought applies, contemporary futurists debate this instability, or volatility, as "cradle to cradle" terrorism; moreover, our security depends upon a realist lens to view it. Obviating that lens from the enemy, and sharing its transparency with our allies requires unique insight into globalization, transformation and leadership beyond authority. "Dirty funds from Grand Caymans to dirty bombs in Grand Central" adroitly captures our nation's security

dilemmas and opens the door to a panacea of interwoven threads of globalization, military power transformation and vital leadership competencies needed in the 21 st Century.

Endnotes

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